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ABSTRACT
In this article, the results of conceptualization of the definition of mind as 
an object of interdisciplinary applied research are described. The purpose of 
the theoretical analysis is to generate a methodological discourse suitable 
for a functional understanding of the mind in the context of the problem of 
natural language processing as one of the components of developments in the 
field of artificial intelligence. The conceptual discourse was realized with the 
help of the author’s method of structural-ontological analysis, and developed 
in the mainstream of the system-methodological tradition of the school of 
G.P. Shchedrovitsky and intended for descriptive research of subject areas of 
interdisciplinary objects of scientific study. As a result of the structural and 
ontological analysis of the super-system, the relevant place and role of the 
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directly studied system (mind) are determined, and its primary process and 
material are localized and structural and functional connections are described. 
At the basic level, the mind is conceptualized as an energy process unfolding in 
a spatio-temporal environment and accompanied by archetypal structuring of 
neural impulses into images. The genesis of the system is separately analyzed 
by constructing a structural-ontological matrix that reflects the initial stage of 
the development of the mind. The primary process is concretized with the help 
of hetero- and homeostatic dichotomy, and also the most significant features 
of the consistent transformation of the material of the system and its ascent to 
verbal morphology are described. The structural-ontological comparison of the 
functioning of the verbal intelligence with the preverbal level has been carried 
out. The transformation of neural impulses of needs into words, as verbal 
units fixing semiotic values is analyzed. Structural-ontological connections 
that determine the reactive and prospective characteristics of the functioning 
of the system are disclosed. The position of the chronological primacy of 
«semiotic readiness» for language with respect to the debut of the latter as 
an information-sign model of the environment is argued. The hypothesis of 
domination at the initial stage of the development of the mind of exopsychic 
functions over endopsychic ones is formulated. The theoretical substantiation 
of the hypothesis of the inevitability of the ontology of language in the 
functional understanding of the mind is given, corresponding structural and 
ontological arguments are given, including those based on the ideas about the 
information relationship between affects and needs, according to the views 
of P.V. Simonov. The arguments are presented in favor of the non-alternative 
methodology of A. Turing in studies of artificial intelligence.
Key words: mind, functional definition, natural language processing, ontology 
of language, artificial intelligence, system, genesis, structural ontology.
Introduction
Defi nition of a mind in sphere of scientifi c research (SR) continues 
to be relevant conceptual problem. The absence of a unique reasonably 
good understanding of mind, conscience or intelligence (henceforward – 
synonyms). It gives further impetus for the progress in the fi eld of the 
so-called «weak» or «narrow» artifi cial intelligence (ANI). 
Applied repertoire of ANI is getting through the life of the 
modern human. ANI offers new solutions and degrees of freedom 
which determine correspondent trends in social infrastructure, industry 
and logistics, global and local economics, policy, military affairs and 
many other fi elds. For the past decade general notable successes of 
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ANI contrast with disparate prospects of artifi cial general intelligence 
(AGI) creation which are still hot and discussed among experts.
In our point of view, the root factor in the multi-vector nature 
of disagreements over AGI is the broad conceptual-semantic entropy 
of basic defi nitions of intelligence (Legg & Hutter, 2007). Substantial 
heterogeneity of theoretical concepts used for these defi nitions. 
Mismatched methodology of fi xation, collection and processing of 
empirical data. The modern philosophical generalization of existing 
ideas about the mind (for example, Searle, 2004) does not provide an 
opportunity for the operational use of defi nitions in the development 
of software designs of AGI. Obviously, the procedure for quantifying 
philosophical ideas is diffi cult because of the implicit idiosyncrasy of 
the corresponding meanings, the mosaic of which forms one or another 
defi nition of the mind. Many components of such mosaics are still 
intuitive and / or internally contradictory, not coordinated. 
The same argument concerns various and numerous attempts to 
formulate the defi nition of the mind, relying on reductive methodology. 
It is notorious that the existing local models of the mind (cognitive, 
cybernetic, behavioral, neuro-physiological, biological, sociological, etc.) 
do not stand the test by validity criterion, at least at the level necessary 
for AGI creation. In this regard, sounded at the dawn of the emergence 
of AI in the 1950 optimism of the well-known English statistician: 
Kendall Maurice: «We should not invoke any entities or forces to 
explain mental phenomena if we can achieve an explanation in terms 
of a possible electronic computer» (cited by Furnham, 2008), remains 
a methodological maximum, to the comprehension of which we will 
return at the conclusion of this article.
Some progress in developing a common denominator for 
understanding of intelligence the methodology of functionalism has 
brought (Levin, 2017), the concept of which stands a competitive 
alternative to the identity theory of mind, behaviorism, and other areas 
of the philosophy of mind. In our opinion, modern functionalism is in 
a state of potentially productive crisis and rethinking its own theoretical 
and methodological ideas. This is evident in a wide-ranging scientifi c 
discussion (Båve, 2017; Bealer, 1984; Bealer, 2001; Endicott, 2011; 
Gillett, 2002, etc.), which looks as sharp and principled, so creative 
and promising. 
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An applied request on a theory of consciousness suitable for 
the creation of a AGI remains unsatisfi ed, and this causes, or at least 
contributes to, the effect of «shifting the motive to the goal» (Leontev, 
1978). Namely, in the absence of a functional defi nition of the mind, 
researchers shift their attention to a structurally more «shallow» notion – 
an intelligent agent.
«We defi ne AI as the study of agents that receive percepts from 
the environment and perform actions. Each such agent implements a 
function that maps percept sequences to actions, and we cover different 
ways to represent these functions, such as reactive agents, real-time 
planners, and decision-theoretic systems. Explain the role We of learning 
as extending the reach of the designer into unknown environments, 
and we show how that role constrains agent design, favoring explicit 
knowledge representation and reasoning» (Russell & Norvig, 2010: 8).
On the one hand, such agent-based reductionism sets the vector of 
approach to the problem of AGI «below-up», from a specifi c intellectual 
function to intelligence per se. On the other hand, the question of 
whether the dialectical transition of the number of intellectual functions 
to the quality of reason is possible in principle or whether agent 
reductionism is fraught with an endless increase in the number of 
various solutions in the fi eld of research and development? However, 
even in the positive case, the problem of determining the mind will 
remain relevant, albeit a posteriori.
We associate the perspectives of a whole, holistic understanding 
of the mind with a systematic comprehension and ordering of ideas 
about its functions. For this purpose, in this article, we propose a 
structural analysis of that ontology, part of which, and at the same time, 
the derivative of which is the mind. We tried less as to determine how 
much to conceptualise the intellect than as an object of interdisciplinary 
applied research. In the proposed conceptualization, we paid special 
attention to the thesis of the «inevitability of language», arguing 
reasonably that natural language processing (NLP) is not only one of 
the leading problems on the way to the creation of AGI (Yampolskiy, 
2013), but also deserves the status of a system-determining factor 
in this issue.
Techniques and methodologies of research
From the point of view of the hypothetical-deductive methodology, 
any scientifi c defi nition (further – defi nition) refl ects the subject fi eld of 
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the corresponding sphere of knowledge that encompasses the studied 
range of phenomena, appearances, events, interactions, connections, 
transformations, regularities, features, etc. In fact, the subject fi eld of 
scientifi c discipline is a mosaic woven from the corresponding defi nitions 
(conceptualizations). Therefore, the formulation of the defi nition can be 
represented as the process of segregation of a particular concept from 
the subject fi eld of knowledge.
For these purposes, we used the author’s method of structural-
ontological analysis, which relies on the tradition of the system 
methodology of G.P. Shchedrovitsky (1966, 1982, 1995). Initially, 
the method was developed as a tool for the practical solution of 
the methodological task of localizing the subject area of various 
psychological studies, but it was also successfully tested in 
interdisciplinary studies (Shymko, 2016, 2018). Appropriate procedural 
features and terminological nuances are disclosed in these publications. 
Here we emphasize that this method allows, fi rst of all to disclose 
and systematize the concept of the subject fi eld of the phenomena 
under investigation with a complex hierarchical structure. Secondly, 
the construction of visual-graphic matrices envisaged by the method 
is conditioned not only by considerations of simplicity, clarity and 
obviousness, built-up concepts. But also serves the purpose of 
overcoming the problem, accurately formulated by J. Lacan as a «wall 
of language» (Lacan, 2006).
Results and discussions
As already noted, for the purposes of a functional description of the 
mind, we used the structural-ontological method. As part of the system 
methodology, at the primary stage of the study it assumes the defi nition 
of the place and role of the system (mind) in the system of a higher 
order (super-system). This procedural step is fraught with considerable 
risks, because reductionism is given right here. For example, the 
description of the mind, as a phenomenon, the genesis and functioning 
of which occurs in a social environment is fraught with a slide into 
sociology. Specifying the super-system, we introduce restrictions, one-
sidedness and prejudice, originally contained in the idea used for the 
concretization. The formulation of even the most abstract ideas can not 
be deprived of one degree or another of concretization, which is due to 
the function of language and its nature. In a sense, any knowledge is 
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reductive. Therefore, the decrease in the degree of reductionism in the 
system description is seen in the maximally justifi ed (for each particular 
study) expansion of the ontological boundaries of the super-system.
As for the systemic study of the mind, the separation of the super-
system is a task that can be solved quite arbitrarily in connection with the 
known epistemological problem of the cognizability of the world. Given 
the fact that any knowledge is a product of the activity of the mind, 
it is simply not possible to go beyond it and take an «over-position». 
This problem remains a classic subject of lengthy philosophical and 
scientifi c rhetoric, avoiding which, we propose the following. Identify 
the subsystem with the environment, understanding the latter as widely 
as possible. Thus, the place of the supersystem occupies an objective 
reality, the ontology of which is refl ected in the notions of the space-time 
continuum (chronotope), matter and fundamental physical interactions. 
An analysis of the current scientifi c understanding of these 
categories (Hawking, 1988; Hawley & Holcomb, 2005; Scheck, 2013; 
Sidharth, 2010; Wudka, 2006 etc.) unequivocally suggests that it is 
advisable to consider the expansion of the universe from the state of 
the so-called singularity as a primary process (Shchedrovitsky, 1995; 
Shymko, 2016) of the super-system. This process is represented by a 
dichotomy of parameters – energy and chronotope , which are refl ected 
on the horizontal axis of the structural-ontological matrix. The vertical 
axis represents the material (Shchedrovitsky, 1995; Shymko, 2016) of 
the super-system, which, in the case under consideration, is physical 
matter. It is represented by a dichotomy substance-fi eld with qualitative 
characteristics – mass and wave, respectively (fi g. 1).
Segmental identifi cation and subsequent analysis of the matrix 
allows structurally differentiate the ontological fi eld of the supersystem 
and check the current methodological inference for the possible presence 
of errors in the criteria of completeness and logical consistency. So, as 
you can see, the schematization of the super-system covers currently 
known types of matter (substance – 2 and 3 segments; fi eld – 1 and 
4 segments) and fundamental interactions (weak and strong nuclear 
interactions – 1 segment; gravitational and electromagnetic – 4 
segment). Mass particles (fermions) occupy the upper half-plane of the 
matrix, where the mechanical and thermodynamic (including chemical) 
effects are logically placed. Massless bosons are consistently present 
on the lower half-plane, ensuring the operation of the corresponding 
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fundamental interactions. In turn, the distribution of types of fundamental 
interactions is logically consistent with their qualitative characteristics. 
For example, the radius of gravity and electromagnetism is not limited. 
While the analogous parameter of weak and strong nuclear interaction 
(10 -18 and 10 -15 m, respectively) can be neglected, taking into account 
not the quantitative character of the structural-ontological matrix. We 
omit the routine enumeration of other similar arguments (here and in 
other schematizations) from considerations of conciseness of the text of 
this article. Thus, the above arguments indicate the completeness and 
internal consistency of the mapping in the matrix of the morphology of 
the supersystem, which allows us to proceed to the next procedural step 
of the structural-ontological method.
Mechanical
phenomena
Quantum 
phenomena
Gravity and 
electromagnetism
Thermodynamic 
effects
Energy Chronotop
Weight
Wave
II segment
I segment 
III segment
IV segment
F E R M I O N S
B O S O N S
Fig. 1. Structural-ontological matrix of the super-system
Developing the system concept of the mind, the functional 
characteristics of which are given by the super-system, we specify the 
primary process and the material of the system. This step is still carried 
out in the paradigmatic framework of functionalism, while also being 
guided by the natural scientifi c principle of similarity (Bridgman, 1937; 
Sedov, 1959) and relying on the principle of parallelism in the form 
and content of thinking (Shchedrovitsky, 1995). This allowed us to form 
a structural-ontological matrix, concretizing the primary process and 
material of the system, proceeding from the functional characteristics 
of the mind. Thus, the horizontal axis refl ects a dichotomy: mental 
energy (mind as an energy phenomena, in the physical sense) and 
environmental fi lling of space-time (hereinafter – the environment), 
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in which the genesis and functioning of the mind is realized (fi g. 2). 
The functional logic of this dichotomy is embodied in the dialectical 
opposition of process and image, which fundamentally characterizes the 
nature of the mental (Leontev, 1978).
Bodily and motor 
activity
Cognitive-
perceptual effects Socio-cultural impacts
Neurohumoral
regulation
Mental
energy 
Environment
Neurons
Archetypes 
II segment
I segment 
III segment
IV segment
I M P U L S E S
I M A G E S 
Fig. 2. The basic structural-ontological matrix of the system
Image processing is a system-forming function of the mind, 
which determines the morphology of the system, by transforming its 
material (the vertical axis in fi g. 2). Thus, the materiality of the mind 
is represented by two dichotomous aspects: 1) neural processing of 
physical stimuli initially provided by the environment; 2) the formation 
of relevant images through archetypes – the mechanisms of ordering 
and structure formation of mental content (Jung, 1981). At the same 
time, we recall that in the concept of Jung it is necessary to distinguish 
the archetype from the archetypical image. Archetype is a mechanism 
of organizing the psychic experience dialectically opposed to instinct, 
which metaphorically designated by Jung as the «axial system of a 
crystal». The archetypal image is the result of such an organization 
(Jung, 1981).
The essence of segments is concisely refl ected in their names 
(fi g. 2). Since this article is of a conceptual nature, here we do not 
dwell on the detailed disclosure of segments. We only note that each 
structural component of the matrix refl ects the corresponding function 
of the mind. At the same time, any of the proposed functions can be 
structurally-ontologically differentiated into smaller composite functions, 
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which must be taken into account in further studies and applied 
developments. It should also be noted that these functions are due not 
only to the content side of the segments, but also to direct and reverse 
intersegmental connections and interactions (which encompass the entire 
matrix), both direct and indirect.
In order not to clutter up the drawing, we gave only one graphic 
example of such connections and interactions (solid and dashed lines 
in fi g. 2, respectively), where the body-motor activity can be either a 
product of the response of neurohumoral dynamics, or the result of 
socio-cultural restrictions or stimulations. The latter, in turn, mediating 
the body-motor segment, can affect neurohumoral parameters and vice 
versa. This structural-ontological matrix is designated by us as a basic 
one, since it reveals the system in its initial (starting) state. This state 
is equivalent to the human psyche, which is at the earliest stage of its 
development. The genesis of the mind is accompanied by quantitative 
changes and qualitative transformations, the conceptual features of 
which were revealed by the two following matrices.
In order to consider the development of the system, it is 
necessary to clarify the visualization of the primary process. So, in 
the basic matrix (fi g. 2) we used the dichotomy of psychic energy – 
theenvironment, widely understanding the latter, as the fullness of space-
time by potentially interacting with the mind objects. However, any 
external infl uence is mediated by internal conditions (Rubinstein, 1957), 
which, in essence, are part of the ontology of the mind. The objective 
environment is always subjectively present in the equation of the mind, 
which responds to the need for interaction with the environment by 
the formation of the adaptation function . In turn, this function is a 
manifestation of such a qualitative characteristic of the system, as 
homeostasis (Cannon, 1932). On the other hand, the unfolding of the 
system in the process of development suggests another (complementary 
to homeostasis) mode of functioning as heterostasis (Selye, 1974). 
Thus, the primary process of the system is appropriate to present as a 
homeostasis-heterostatic dichotomy (fi g. 3).
The foregoing view of the positioning of the primary process 
makes it logically necessary that the system material be appropriately 
objectifi ed. Thus, the neuron-impulse response of the material appears 
as a sphere of needs and, as a consequence, the emerging frustration 
states. On the other hand, the structure-forming action of archetypes 
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ensures the ordering of the experience with the crystallization of the 
corresponding values (meanings) into words, as speech units (fi g. 3). 
However, it is important to note that the material obtains these 
properties not simultaneously, but in the process of a complex genesis 
that proceeds discretely.
Behavior, as locomotor 
activity in the 
environment
of Eidetic memory, 
as a function of 
experience
Language as an 
information-sign model 
of the environment
Affective (emotional) 
dynamics 
Homeostasis 
Needs
Words (speech) 
II segment
I segment 
III segment
IV segment
F R U S T R A T I O N
M E A N I N G S
Heterostasis
1
2
3
4
5
Fig. 3. Structural-ontological matrix of the system. Stage of development
Thus, the activity of the developing system is initially concentrated 
in the 2nd and 3rd segments of the matrix and is associated with the 
affective and motor-motor aspects of experiencing frustrations and 
meeting needs (line 1, fi g. 3). This is accompanied by activation of 
perception and memorization of actual images (segment 1, fi g. 3), the 
synthesis of which is the result of the structuring work of archetypes. 
These images are differentiated according to the criteria of localization 
of «triggering» stimuli to «internal» (line 2, fi gure 3) and «external» 
(line 3, fi gure 3), being prototypes of endopsychic and exopsychic 
ones. Functions of mature mind, respectively. Already at this stage of 
the structural-ontological analysis of the system it is obvious that the 
localization of the ego, as a functional operator of the mind, is connected 
with segment 1 (fi g. 3). Among other things, this localization makes 
it possible to shed light on the structural and ontological dynamics of 
the experiencing and observing ego functions traditionally identifi ed 
and studied in psychoanalysis (Freud, 1961; McWilliams, 2011 etc.). 
However, consideration of this and other issues would go beyond the 
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scope of this paper. In this context it should be noted that the perception 
of internal and external stimuli (line 2 and line 3, respectively, fi g. 3) 
is also associated with a prospective function of the mind, as will be 
discussed later.
As we have just demonstrated, schematically presented in fi g. 3, the 
material (in the form of a demand dichotomy – words) reaches the level 
of verbal organization of the experience not immediately. The primary 
process unfolds spirally along the «triangular trajectory» (lines 1, 2, 3, 
fi g. 3), gradually increasing the amplitude of the legs of this structural-
logical triangle. In our opinion, this preverbal phase has the following 
target determination. This «buildup» is the development of cognitive-
perceptual characteristics of the eidetic function of the mind to the level 
necessary for the processing of images having a grammatical structure 
(words). It is signifi cant that the mastery of the language occurs on the 
basis of the specifi c and the particular to the abstract and general. First, 
the mind takes possession of separate undifferentiated elements of oral 
speech (words and sounds), later there is the ability for elementary oral 
vocabulary and phraseology and only after that grammatical speech is 
formed and readiness for the development of writing appears.
As you can see, the achievement by the material of the level 
system of verbal organization, on the one hand, requires a certain 
degree of differentiation of the function of processing abstract fi gurative 
models (segment 1, fi g. 3). The source of these models is the socio-
cultural environment that interacts with the mind through the language 
(line 5, fi g. 3). The availability of this component of the ontology of the 
environment, again, opens with the growth of the process capabilities of 
the eidetic function. Thus, the appearance of a system of verbal content 
in the morphology signifi es the attainment of a qualitative moment by 
the mind in its development. Namely, the verbalization of the mind is 
connected with quantitative and qualitative transformation. On the other 
hand, this transformation is a non-alternative necessary condition for 
the further development of the mind and the transition of the system 
to a mature level of functioning, as will be demonstrated by us later. 
This nodal point of the ascent of the developing system to verbal 
morphology lies at the basis of our thesis about the inevitability of the 
ontology of language.
Developing this thesis, on the basis of a comparison of the repertory 
latitude and the structural-target complexity of the adaptive behavior 
У  пошуках  функціонального  визначення  розуму:  неминучість . . .
338 © Шимко  Віталій
of humans and animals, one can theoretically assume the following. 
The verbalization of the mind is not only possible with the increasing 
ability of the mind to abstract, it (verbalization) is appropriate given 
the physical limitations of the information-computational capabilities of 
the mind. Despite serious optimism of researchers in this issue (Bartol, 
Bromer, Kinney etc., 2015), it is necessary to take into account that 
the system’s processing involves not only the capture, fi xation, storage 
and reactivation of relevant data, but also a whole cluster of other 
functions – analysis, comparison, synthesis, modeling, forecasting, etc. 
At the same time, questions concerning the speed and quality of 
simultaneous execution of such operations in different environmental 
conditions and the states of the system itself remain, mainly, open. Our 
idea boils down to the fact that the language is the functional tool that 
allows you to «compress» (conceptualize) the processed data, thereby 
speeding up and optimizing the work of the mind.
Another facet of the above idea is related to the specifi cs of 
the process of signifi cation. According to our understanding of the 
structural ontology of the mind (fi g. 1–3), the neural impulses from the 
matter plane are transformed by archetypes into a plan fi eld , forming 
a value whose essence should be understood primarily ontologically 
and, secondarily, in the semiotic terms. It is important to take into 
account that, neuron-impulse effects (generating values, as ontology) 
have a temporal localization, conditioned by the objective properties of 
the chronotope. Thus, ontological signifi cance has a fi xed «lifetime», 
which causes the possibility of its processing only on here-and-now 
basis. That is, the primary process of the system, functioning within the 
framework mentioned above, of the «triangular trajectory» (lines 1, 2, 
3, fi g. 3) limits the mind to reactivity properties. For the appearance 
of prospectivity, the mind needs a semiotic mechanism that fi xes the 
meaning and ensures the possibility of its re-actualization (through the 
memory function) without the appropriate neuron-pulse stimulation. 
It is noteworthy that such a prospectivity in children is found in the 
preverbal phase of development, which was experimentally confi rmed 
by Piaget (1926, 1928, 1952) . This indicates the «semiotic readiness» 
of the child present before the development of the ability to perceive 
the environment through language. Thus, language is not represented as 
a foreign sign mechanism, which is «imposed» by the environment, but 
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rather as a mechanism for the development of the inherent function of 
the mind with the help of appropriate environmental stimulation.
For an explanatory and specifi ed commentary on this idea, let’s 
use the central formula of the information theory of emotions proposed 
by Simonov (1991): E =-N * (Ia-In) , where E is the emotion; -N – 
actualized need, Ia – necessary information (to meet the needs) and In – 
existing (perceived) information. Depending on the ratio of necessary and 
existing information, the modality of emotional experience is determined. 
At the same time, the adaptive function of the mind (homeostasis) is 
subject to such a target determination, which in the framework of the 
Simonov model can be represented as In> = Ia . Obviously, achieving 
such a relationship is impossible without the prospectivity of the mind, 
and its ability to anticipate (heterostasis). The mere possibility of the 
transition from reactivity to prospectiveity is ensured by the semiotics 
of the language, which allows (similarly to computer technology) to 
operatively implement «data buffering» in speech. This also allows 
the mind to move from ascertaining to anticipation and planning. 
It is also logical to assume that the prospective function (Ia) and the 
perception function (In) have a single structural-ontological basis 
(lines 2 and 3, fi g. 3). 
As noted above, «semiotic readiness» is present at the pre-verbal 
stage, structurally-ontologically coinciding with the perception of 
extrinsic stimuli (line 3, fi gure 3). However, it qualitatively transforms 
with the mastering of the language, naturally accompanied by the same 
qualitative transformation of perception of the environment (line 4, 
fi g. 3). In this case, the perception of internal stimuli (line 2, fi g. 3) 
remains outside the structural and ontological space of this qualitative 
transition. Thus, the appearance of verbal quality in the material of the 
system sets the impulse for the development of exopsychic functions, 
fi guratively speaking, leaving endopsychic functions aside this process. 
We believe that this feature causes a relatively late (in the development 
of the mind) appearance of the ability to refl ect, which realizes itself 
by the principle of exopsychic, turned inward. This requires high 
differentiation of exopsychic, to achieve the necessary level of which 
refl ection, mainly, is carried out indirectly and post factum (in the form 
of perception and comprehension of the objectifi ed effects of interaction 
with the environment). In addition to the temporal and sequential 
features of the system development, this reasoning provides the basis 
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for a rethinking of the thesis of the autonomy and equivalence of such 
ontological categories of psychic energy as extraversion and introversion 
(Jung, 1923).
Returning to Simonov’s information formula, let’s pay attention to 
the fact that emotional dynamics (segment 2, fi g. 3), reveals not only 
the role of the indicator of the status of prospective function (negative 
emotions, as a signal about the defi cit of In). But also acts as a 
functional regulator, ensuring the interaction of regimes such as reactivity 
and prospectivity. Thus, the role of neurohumoral regulation (segment 2, 
fi g. 2) and, as a consequence, affective dynamics (segment 2, fi gure 3) 
in the nonverbal and verbal functional regimes of the mind, as well as 
in the etiology of the language per se, is actualized. In our opinion, 
for this the neurohumoral-affective factor should not be viewed in an 
emotional manner, but in the context of experience, as a structural and 
dynamic phenomenon (Vasilyuk, 1991). 
At the end of the main material of the article, we will return once 
again to the position of Maurice Kendal about the inexpediency of 
explaining the mind through any concepts or phenomena, provided there 
is the possibility of explanation with the help of computer terminology. 
First, such a hypothetical explanation would correspond to the dotted 
line on the structural-ontological matrix we examined (fi g. 3) and would 
not disclose the integrity of the mind, but would only refl ect a certain 
functional facet of the intellect. Secondly, this is only hypothetical, 
since any explanation is part of an extensive ontology of the mind 
that has a complex hierarchical structure. As far as the existence of 
an explanation outside the language is unthinkable, so illusory, in our 
opinion, is the assumption that the computer language has some kind 
of its own ontology. Artifi cial languages, including mathematical ones, 
are sign systems, created and functioning according to the principle of 
«compressing» conceptualizations (see the thesis above in this article), 
which are the basis of natural language. Therefore, we believe that NLP 
is a system-forming problem in AGI development. In this connection, 
the methodology of Turing (1950) remains a non-alternative approach to 
verifying success on this path.
Conclusions and prospects
In this article, the results of conceptualization of the defi nition of 
mind as an object of interdisciplinary applied research are described. 
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The purpose of the theoretical analysis is to generate a methodological 
discourse suitable for a functional understanding of the mind in the 
context of the problem of natural language processing as one of the 
components of developments in the fi eld of artifi cial intelligence. The 
conceptual discourse was realized with the help of the author’s method 
of structural-ontological analysis, and developed in the mainstream of 
the system-methodological tradition of the school of G.P. Shchedrovitsky 
and intended for descriptive research of subject areas of interdisciplinary 
objects of scientifi c study.
As a result of the structural and ontological analysis of the super-
system, the relevant place and role of the directly studied system (mind) 
are determined, and its primary process and material are localized and 
structural and functional connections are described. At the basic level, 
the mind is conceptualized as an energy process unfolding in a spatio-
temporal environment and accompanied by archetypal structuring of 
neural impulses into images. The genesis of the system is separately 
analyzed by constructing a structural-ontological matrix that refl ects 
the initial stage of the development of the mind. The primary process 
is concretized with the help of hetero- and homeostatic dichotomy, 
and also the most signifi cant features of the consistent transformation 
of the material of the system and its ascent to verbal morphology are 
described. The structural-ontological comparison of the functioning of 
the verbal intelligence with the preverbal level has been carried out. The 
transformation of neural impulses of needs into words, as verbal units 
fi xing semiotic values is analyzed. Structural-ontological connections that 
determine the reactive and prospective characteristics of the functioning 
of the system are disclosed. The position of the chronological primacy 
of «semiotic readiness» for language with respect to the debut of the 
latter as an information-sign model of the environment is argued. The 
hypothesis of domination at the initial stage of the development of the 
mind of exopsychic functions over endopsychic ones is formulated. 
The theoretical substantiation of the hypothesis of the inevitability of 
the ontology of language in the functional understanding of the mind 
is given, corresponding structural and ontological arguments are given, 
including those based on the ideas about the information relationship 
between affects and needs, according to the views of P.V. Simonov. The 
arguments are presented in favor of the non-alternative methodology of 
A. Turing in studies of artifi cial intelligence.
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Formulating the prospects for further steps, we would like to note 
two points. The fi rst one is an extended, deep description of the structural-
ontological matrices proposed in this work, as well as the process of 
the primary development of the system. This work, by virtue of the 
extraordinary information saturation and content-structural complexity 
of the interdisciplinary subject under study, can not objectively be 
satisfi ed (by the criterion of completeness) within the framework of a 
brief scientifi c report and requires scales commensurate with the volume 
of monographic research. For example, outside the framework of the 
current article, there remains a detailed description of the composition 
of segments and a list of intersegmental relationships in matrices, which 
directly determines the completeness of the functional opening of the 
mind and its features – structural, genetic, transformational, and others. 
The second promising moment we associate with the continuation, begun 
in this article, the presentation of the results of the author’s analysis 
of the development of the system and the achievement of its condition, 
conditionally designated by us, as a mature stage. The highlighting 
of the structural and ontological features of this stage presupposes a 
description of the nuances of differentiation of the primary process and 
the further transformation of the material of the system in the direction 
of the morphology of the mind, including such components as reasoning, 
discourse, value determination, worldview, creative activity, etc.
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АНОТАЦІЯ
У статті викладено результати концептуалізації поняття розум, 
як об’єкту міждисциплінарного прикладного дослідження. Ціль 
проведеного теоретичного аналізу – генерування методологічного 
дискурсу, придатного функціонального осмислення розуму в контексті 
проблеми обробки природної мови, як однієї з складових розробок 
у сфері штучного інтелекту. Реалізацію концептуального дискурсу 
здійснено за допомогою авторського методу структурно-онтологічного 
аналізу, якій розроблено в руслі системно-методологічної традиції 
школи Г.П. Щедровицького задля потреб дескриптивних досліджень 
предметних областей міждисциплінарних об’єктів наукового вивчення. 
В результаті структурно-онтологічного аналізу надсистеми, 
визначені відповідні місце і роль системи, що безпосередньо вивчається 
(розум), а також локалізовані її первинний процес та матеріал, 
описані структурно-функціональні зв’язки. На базисному рівні 
концептуалізовано розум як енергетичний процес, який розгортається 
в просторово-часовому середовищі та супроводжується архетиповим 
структуруванням нейронних імпульсів у образи. Окремо проаналізовано 
генезис системи за допомогою побудови структурно-онтологічної 
матриці, яка відображає ініціальну стадію розвитку розуму. Первинний 
процес конкретизовано за допомогою гетеро- та гомеостатичної 
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дихотомії, а також описані найбільш суттєві особливості 
послідовної трансформації матеріалу системи та її розвитку в 
напрямку вербальної морфології. Проведено структурно-онтологічне 
порівняння функціонування вербального розуму з довербальним 
рівнем. Проаналізована трансформація нейронних імпульсів потреб 
в слова, як мовленнєві одиниці, що фіксують семіотичне значення. 
Розкриті структурно-онтологічні зв’язки, які зумовлюють реактивні 
та проспективні характеристики функціонування системи. Наведено 
аргументацію позиції щодо хронологічної первинності «семіотичної 
готовності» до мови по відношенню до її дебюту, як інформаційно-
знакової моделі середовища. Сформульовано гіпотезу домінування 
на початковому етапі розвитку розуму екзопсихічних функцій на 
ендопсихічними. Наведено теоретичне обґрунтування гіпотези щодо 
неминучості онтології мови в функціональному осмисленні розуму, 
викладені відповідні структурно-онтологічні аргументи, які, в тому 
числі, спираються на погляди щодо інформаційного взаємозв’язку між 
афектами і потребами, відповідно до поглядів П.В.  Симонова. Висловлені 
аргументи на користь безальтернативності методології А.  Тюрінга 
щодо досліджень штучного інтелекту.
Ключові слова: розум, функціональне визначення, обробка природної 
мови, онтологія мови, штучний інтелект, система, генезис, структурна 
онтологія.
Шимко Виталий. В поисках функционального определения разума: 
неизбежность онтологии языка
АННОТАЦИЯ
В данной статье изложены результаты концептуализации понятия 
разум, как объекта междисциплинарного прикладного исследования. 
Цель проведенного теоретического анализа – генерирование 
методологического дискурса, пригодного для функционального 
понимания разума в контексте проблемы обработки естественного 
языка, как одной из составляющей разработок в сфере искусственного 
интеллекта. Реализация концептуального дискурса осуществлена с 
помощью авторского метода структурно-онтологического анализа, 
разработанного в русле системно-методологической традиции школы 
Г.П. Щедровицкого и предназначенного для дексриптивных исследований 
предметных областей междисциплинарных объектов научного изучения. 
В результате структурно-онтологического анализа надсистемы, 
определены соответствующие место и роль непосредственно 
изучаемой системы (разума), а также локализованы ее первичный 
процесс и материал, описаны структурно-функциональные связи. 
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На базисном уровне разум концептуализован как энергетический 
процесс, разворачивающийся в пространственно-временной среде и 
сопровождающейся архетипическим структурированием нейронных 
импульсов в образы. Отдельно проанализирован генезис системы 
с помощью построения структурно-онтологической матрицы, 
отражающей инициальную стадию развития разума. Первичный 
процесс конкретизирован с помощью гетеро- и гомеостатической 
дихотомии, а также описаны наиболее существенные особенности 
последовательной трансформации материала системы и ее 
восхождения к вербальной морфологии. Проведено структурно-
онтологическое сравнение функционирования вербального разума с 
довербальным уровнем. Проанализирована трансформация нейронных 
импульсов потребностей в слова, как речевые единицы, фиксирующие 
семиотические значения. Раскрыты структурно-онтологические связи, 
обуславливающие реактивные и проспективные характеристики 
функционирования системы. Аргументирована позиция хронологической 
первичности «семиотической готовности» к языку по отношению 
к дебюту последнего, как информационно-знаковой модели среды. 
Сформулирована гипотеза доминирования на начальном этапе 
развития разума экзопсихических функций над эндопсихическими. 
Приведено теоретическое обоснование гипотезы неизбежности 
онтологии языка в функциональном понимании разума, приведены 
соответствующие структурно-онтологические аргументы, в том 
числе опирающиеся на представления об информационной взаимосвязи 
между аффектами и потребностями, согласно взглядов П.В.  Симонова. 
Высказаны аргументы в пользу безальтернативности методологии 
А.  Тюринга в исследованиях искусственного разума.
Ключевые слова: разум, функциональное определение, обработка 
естественного языка, онтология языка, искусственный интеллект, 
система, генезис, структурная онтология.
